Workplace Equality in International Organizations: A Way Forward by Jefferson, Osmat Azzam
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Jefferson, Osmat Azzam (2008) Workplace Equality in International Or-
ganizations: A Way Forward. SSRN : Social Science Research Network,
08.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/39829/
c© Copyright 2008 Social Science Electronic Publishing
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1236602
 
 
 
 
THE AUSTRALIAN 
NATIONAL UNIVERISTY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANU COLLEGE OF LAW 
 
Social Science Research Network 
Legal Scholarship Network 
 
ANU College of Law Research Paper No. 08-31 
 
Osmat Jefferson - Workplace Equality in 
International Organizations: A Way Forward 
 
http://ssrn.com/AuthorID=734493
http://ssrn.com/AbstractID=1236602
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1236602
LAWS 8301- Graduate Research Unit 
Name: Osmat Azzam Jefferson- u4190017 
Length: 13,823 words 
June 15, 2008    
 
 
Workplace Equality in International Organizations: A Way Forward 
 
“Clearly law is not just the sum of courts, legislatures, police, prosecutors, and other formal 
institutions with some direct connection to law.  Law is also a normative system that resides in 
the minds of the citizens of a society”1 
 
Legal Scholars agree that the challenges to workplace equality are subtle and "structural" 
rather than overt and individual.2  Gender, race, sex and others characteristics have and 
will continue to factor in employment decisions.  Based on her findings from the social 
science literature, 3 Kristin Green demonstrated that there is a pervasive implicit bias in 
the workplace decision-making that is independent of the explicit bias. That bias can 
actually translates into a behavior in a group setting4 and is influenced by the specific 
                                                
1 Thomas Carothers, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad The Problem of Knowledge’ (Working 
paper 44, Carnagie Endowment for International Peace, 2003) 8. 
2 Tristin K Green, ‘A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer 
Wrong’ (2007) 60(3) Vanderbilt Law Review 849. 
3 Mahzarin R. Banaji, ‘The Opposite of a Great Truth is Also True: Homage to Koan #7’  in John 
T. Jost et al. (eds)  Perspectivism In Social Psychology: The Yin & Yang Of Scientific Progress 
(2003)127, 130-38 as cited in Green, above n 2, 854. 
4 John F. Dovidio et al., ‘Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction’ (2002) 82 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 62 as cited in Green, above n 2, 855.  
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contexts in which individuals operate.5  So, demographic makeup of the workplace as a 
whole and of work groups, prominence of alternative in-group and out-group boundaries, 
distribution of power, institutional culture, and information availability affect the degree 
of unconscious bias and its effect on decision-making; that is what makes “structural 
discrimination”.6  Under structural discrimination, Green explains, discrimination 
becomes “more than a problem of bias in isolation at discrete moments of formal 
decision-making, it becomes a problem of the workplace structures and environments that 
facilitate bias in the workplace on a day-to-day basis”.7  Green argues that although these 
decisions may or may not be conscious biases, they are still stereotypes operating within 
a permissive institutional context and need to be addressed at the structural level of the 
institute.8 In a recent article, Green proposed a legal framework to obligate employers to 
take structural measures to minimize discriminatory bias in workplace decision-making.9 
 
In this contribution, I focus on the International Organizations (IOs) mainly the United 
Nations (UN), a public forum to all states political leaders to debate and advance their 
concerns, the World Bank, a financial organization that promotes economic development, 
mainly in developing countries, and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR), the eldest and largest global public program of the World Bank with 
a strategic network of diverse stakeholders that harnesses the best in science to produce 
                                                
5 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, ‘Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination’ (2004) 94 Amer. 
Econ.Rev. 991, 992 as cited in Green, above n2, 856. 
6 Tristin K. Green, ‘Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a StructuralAccount of 
DisparateTreatment Theory’ (2003) 38 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 91. 
7 Green, above n 2, 857.  
8 Banaji, above n 2, 854. 
9 Green, above n 2, 873. 
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more and better food, reduce poverty and sustain environments.  I am interested in how 
discrimination issues are manifested in employment relations in these organizations and 
what are the current organization practices.  Considering the immunity and privileges 
granted to international organizations, what are the current available legal procedures, at 
the national or international level, for workplace equality? How accountable and 
transparent are they based on the practice of these organizations? Can discrimination 
biases that go beyond the known individual-based discrimination claims be identified? 
How can they be challenged and changed?  
 
I begin by presenting a more general context in which these organizations were founded 
and their purposes evolved over the years. Following on the evolution and some 
intellectual interpretations for their purposes, in part II, I examine the granted privileges 
and immunities under international law and the impact they have had on the employment 
relations in general and employment discrimination in particular.  To better understand 
the employment relations within the international organization context, in part III, I turn 
into the internal structure of the workplace and examine in details the entitlements for 
such a relationship with the staff and describe in part IV the various modalities of 
employment settlement disputes in these organizations.  Drawing on the contextual 
knowledge, judgments in Administrative tribunals and reports, and mainly the practice of 
these international organizations, in part V, I relay and identify some of the structural 
discrimination biases that still persist and proliferate permissively in the international 
workplace and show that such a subtle and structural discrimination is enabled by 
discretionary decisions within the organization.   In part VI and based on Kristin Green, 
 4 
Margaret Thornton, and Joan Acker works, I reflect on these new forms of challenges and 
the way forward.  Based of the special position of international civil servants in 
international organizations and the duty to protect their fundamental rights, I claim that 
the limitation of opportunity by discriminatory biases and the psychic burden on the 
individual staff member, on daily basis, qualify for a workplace wrong and call for 
independent and impartial legal procedures that would ensure due process and fair 
treatment. 
 
I.  The context  
 
A. The Foundation of modern international organizations 
Historically, to solve problems at a multilateral basis, various states had to convene 
international conferences. 10 Once agreements were reached, a formal treaty was adopted 
with defined obligations.  The principle of equality was at the heart of the conference 
system.11  Any substantive decision was subject to the rule of unanimity and not taken 
based on some majority vote.   In the nineteenth century, however, these ad hoc 
conferences were becoming inefficient and limited in solving political issues, and so 
international associations among groups other than governments began to emerge and 
were followed by associations among government branches that are administrative rather 
                                                
10 Carol Lancaster, ‘Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics’ (2006) Chapter 2.  
11 C. F. Amerasinghe, ‘Priniciples of the Institutional Law of International Organizations’ 
(second edition, 2005) 2. 
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than political.12  In particular, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed further 
development of these associations into International Organizations (IOs).13 
 
How did the new concept of international organizations compare to the original 
international conferences? In the new concept, the decision-making process became 
affected by two trends other than the unanimity rule; one that is based on the majority and 
the other that is based on building “consensus”, allowing, thus, for substantive decisions 
to be taken either without a formal vote or by a weighted voting with a more influence 
from those allocating budgetary contributions, and various interest groups other than 
government bodies. 14  The retained institutional element along with a permanent 
administrative body gave IOs the assimilating potential for furthering “an interest 
common to numerous states without detriment to that of any concerned”. 15 
 
After the Treaty of Versailles and the rise and collapse of the League of Nations at the 
onset of World War II, precedents in international institutional law were established to 
shape the new modern IOs. As a starting point for the creation of any new IO, a legally 
binding instrument, a charter, was proposed along with institutional frameworks that are 
replicates to those of the League and an international instrument that would limit the 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid 4. 
14 José Alvarez, ‘International Organizations as Law Makers’ (2005) 10. 
15 Hyde, ‘International Law’ (1947) vol I, p. 131 as cited in Amerasinghe, above n 11, 5.  
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State’s “domestic jurisdiction”.16 As suggested by David Kennedy, the power of these 
institutes, when allied with the rule of law, become transformative.17   
 
Today, IOs are diverse in nature, size of their membership, and impact. According to the 
latest edition of the Yearbook of International Organizations (2007/2008), the number of 
all known international organizations is 61,345; of these, 7759 are conventional inter-
governmental bodies that include 36 federations of IOs, 502 with universal membership, 
1083 with intercontinental membership, and 6138 with regional oriented membership.18   
With the departure from the principle of equality in decision making and the enormous 
proliferation of IOs, one can not but pose to reflect on the great potential of these 
institutions to impact world matters.  However, Alvarez writes that “IOs are too complex 
to be reduced to typologies, their normative impact too broad to be limited to specialized 
branches of domestic or international law, their evolving nature too difficult to pin down 
to one character type”. 19  So, for the sake of this article, I focus the discussion on the 
public international organization that deals with matters of global concern such as 
international peace and security, the UN, and the biggest financial institute that deals with 
development, World Bank and its eldest global program and science-based network in 
International Agriculture, the CGIAR.  
 
B. The purposes and their evolution 
                                                
16 Alvarez, above n 14, 23. 
17 David Kennedy, ‘The Move to Institutions’ (1987) 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 841 as cited in Alvarez, 
above n 14, 23. 
18 Union of International Association (ed) ‘Yearbook of International organizations’ (vol 1B (Int-
Z) 2007/2008), Appendix 3: Table 1a. 
19 Alvarez, above n 14, 12. 
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Whereas the central purpose stated in the UN Charter is the prevention of war, the 
Charter also recognized that collective actions to achieve security, economic, and social 
goals, including human rights for all equally, are essential and required to achieve peace.  
A broader perspective is illustrated in the Preamble. 
 
 “We the peoples of the United Nations determined 
 to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and 
 to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and 
  to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and 
 to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, 
and for these ends 
 to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, 
and 
  to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and 
 to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed 
force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international 
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, 
 
have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims”.20   
 
                                                
20 UN Charter Preamble < http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ > at June 12, 2008. 
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To encourage full participation in the organization, the UN Charter had the United States 
at the core of the organization and its key organs, the Security Council from the outset, 
and the United States and four other powerful states were accorded special privileges 
such as permanent seats on the Security Council and veto powers.21  While in most UN 
debates, “Sovereign equality” was at the heart of discussions, (see Article 2 of the 
Charter)22, I guess, the riding element in the Charter was, one can argue, the centrality of 
power in the Security Council decisions by the 5 major states. Under the terms of Chapter 
VII of the Charter, these decisions, once adopted, could be imposed or even enforced on 
all members. 23 From1945 until 1992, the UN was seen as the main public forum or the 
“first stop” to security challenges, however, after the Cold War, the Council unity started 
to fragment and resolutions on conflicts in various regions of the globe were met with a 
limited success.24  In 2000, and under General Assembly resolution 55/2,25 member states 
renewed their commitments to promote freedom, equality for all, solidarity, tolerance, 
respect for nature, and shared responsibility were identified.  Unfortunately, this vast 
project was halted by the events of September 11, 2001, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
In 2005, and during 2005, The UN secretary General reported: 
 
 “16. Not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also 
                                                
21 Simon Chesterman, Thomas M. Franck, & David M. Malone, ‘Law and Practice of the United 
Nations’ (2008) 19. 
22 UN Charter, above n 20, Chapter I, Article 2 as also cited in Chesterman et al., above n 21, 
599. 
23 UN Charter, above n 20, Chapter VII as cited in Chesterman et al., above n 21, 606. 
24 Chesterman et al, above n 21, 53. 
25 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, GA Res 2, UN Millennium Declaration, 55th sess, 
UN doc A Res/55/2 (2000) < 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/559/51/PDF/N0055951.pdf?OpenElement > at 
June 12, 2008. 
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reinforce each other.”…… 
“20. States, however, cannot do the job alone. We need an active civil society and a 
dynamic private sector. Both occupy an increasingly large and important share of 
the space formerly reserved for States alone, and it is plain that the goals outlined 
here will not be achieved without their full engagement. 
21. We also need agile and effective regional and global intergovernmental 
institutions to mobilize and coordinate collective action. As the world’s only 
universal body with a mandate to address security, development and human rights 
issues, the United Nations bears a special burden. As globalization shrinks distances 
around the globe and these issues become increasingly interconnected, the 
comparative advantages of the United Nations become ever more evident. So too, 
however, do some of its real weaknesses. From overhauling basic management 
practices and building a more transparent, efficient and effective United Nations 
system to revamping our major intergovernmental institutions so that they reflect 
today’s world and advance the priorities set forth in the present report, we must 
reshape the Organization in ways not previously imagined and with a boldness and 
speed not previously shown. 
22. In our efforts to strengthen the contributions of States, civil society, the private 
sector and international institutions to advancing a vision of larger freedom, we 
must ensure that all involved assume their responsibilities to turn good words into 
good deeds. We therefore need new mechanisms to ensure accountability — the 
accountability of States to their citizens, of States to each other, of international 
institutions to their members and of the present generation to future generations. 
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Where there is accountability we will progress; where there is none we will 
under perform. The business of the summit to be held in September 2005 must be to 
ensure that, from now on, promises made are promises kept.” 26 Today the UN has 192 
members  and 14,000 employees spread around the globe.”27  
 
The World Bank was also established as part of the UN system,28 however, since 1945 it 
has evolved into two separate but complementary development institutions; the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International 
Development Association (IDA).29 The Bank runs as a cooperative with 185 member 
countries as shareholders.  The five largest shareholders, the United States, France, 
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, appoint each an Executive Director and the 
rest of the members are represented by 19 Executive Directors.  These 24 Executive 
Directors work at the bank and are responsible for the “approval of loans and guarantees, 
new policies, the administrative budget, country assistance strategies and borrowing and 
financial decisions”.30  By tradition, the Bank largest shareholder, the United States 
nominates the Bank president and so, a US national is always at the top of the hierarchy 
in the World Bank supervising about 10,000 employees from various nationalities spread 
                                                
26 Report of the Secretary General, In larger freedom: towards development, security and 
human rights for all, 59th sess, UN Doc A/59/2005 (2005) 7 < 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElement > at 
June 12, 2008. 
27 <https://jobs.un.org/elearn/production/home.html> and 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2007/org1479.doc.htm. 
28 Chesterman et al, above n  21, 31. 
29 The World Bank, About us < 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410~piPK:36
602~theSitePK:29708,00.html> at May 30, 2008. 
30 Ibid. 
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over 100 countries.31  
Under Article1 of the Articles of Agreement, the purpose of the World Bank, as an 
institution, is to  "assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members” 
mainly, war torn European territories, by providing international long-term loans and 
technical expertise.32 With the introduction of the Marshall Plan and the implementation 
of US foreign aid policies in Europe, the Bank switched from reconstruction lending to 
"project lending" in developing countries and the main purposes of the Bank became the 
promotion of economic growth and the reduction of poverty.33  The Bank achieves these 
goals by providing loans, guarantees, and technical assistance for projects in member 
countries.  And by 1968, Robert McNamara, the 5th president of the Bank then, 
introduced a “people’s basic needs” approach into the Bank, and once again, the 
investments shifted from a focus on the physical to the human part.34  The shift was a 
reaction to the failure of rapid industrialization to produce benefits for most of the poor 
and the purpose expanded to the promotion of “distributional equity along with economic 
growth”.35 In the early 1970s, lending focused on improving agriculture, public health, 
and education.    
Under these circumstances, the CGIAR was founded in 1971 mainly to use the best 
                                                
31 The World Bank, Organization < 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040580~me
nuPK:1696997~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html > at  May 31, 2008. 
32 IBRD Articles of Agreement, art. 1.1 < 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049557~me
nuPK:58863~pagePK:43912~piPK:44037~theSitePK:29708,00.html >   at May 30, 2008.  
33 Sandra Blanco & Enrique Carrasco, ‘The Functions of the IMF & the World Bank’ (1999) 9 
Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 67 accessed at 
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/PDF_Files/Part_1_2.pdf  at June 13, 2008. 
34 Ibid, 16; and Namita Wahi, ‘Human Rights Accountability of the IMF and the World Bank: A 
Critique of Existing Mechanisms and Articulation of a theory of Horizontal Accountability’ 
(2006) 12 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 331. 
35 Ibid. 
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science-based tools and technologies in advanced countries and adopt them for the 
benefit of food-deficit countries and populations.36 It was and still is the first and the 
largest global public goods program to be supported by grants from the World Bank.37 
Initially, the CGIAR supported four already existing international agricultural research 
Centers that were established by the Ford and Rockefeller foundations: International 
Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) in Colombia, International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico, International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria, and International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the 
Philippines.38  
 
Today, the CGIAR system grew to be an informal association of 64 Members (public and 
private) supporting 15 international Centers39, “ loosely connected” by a network of (a) 
the Consultative Group, its Executive Council and partners; (b) the Science Council, 
which helps to maintain the high quality of science in the CGIAR System; and (c) the 
independent international agricultural research Centers supported by the CGIAR, and 
Center committees. These are supported by the CGIAR System Office, which has a 
pivotal role in the integration and administration of the System.40 CGIAR Membership 
include 21 developing and 26 industrialized countries, four co-sponsors as well as 13 
other international organizations with more than 8,000 CGIAR scientists and staff spread 
                                                
36 The CGIAR at http://www.cgiar.org/who/index.html at June 1, 2008; World Bank, The CGIAR 
at 31: An Independent Meta-Evaluation of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research, Volume 1: Overview Report (2003) < http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/cgiar/> at June 
13, 2008. 
37 Ibid. 
38 The CGIAR Charter §9< http://www.cgiar.org/pdf/charter%202007_main%20text.pdf>  at June 
1, 2008. 
39 Ibid, §1. 
40 Ibid, §2. 
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over 100 countries.41 The World Bank, as the main co-sponsor, hosts the CGIAR 
secretariat and its staff, and the president nominates the CGIAR Chair who is usually the 
vice president overseeing the sectoral work in agriculture42, who subsequently selects the 
CGIAR director who will also be a World Bank senior staff.43 Maintaining its informal 
structure, the CGIAR was founded initially “without a charter, rules of procedure, or 
conditions or procedures for membership”, however, as the system’s activities expanded, 
a reform program was initiated in 2001 and a Charter was drafted in 2004 and amended 
in 2006 and 2007 and decision-making remains based on consensus rather than by vote.44 
The latest mission of the CGIAR is “to achieve sustainable food security and reduce 
poverty in developing countries through scientific research and research-related activities 
in the fields of agriculture, livestock, forestry, fisheries, policy and natural resource 
management”.45 
 
II. Immunity and granted privileges: impact on the workplace 
 
IOs enjoy privileges and immunities only because they are needed for the fulfillment of 
their purposes and functions.  Due to the enormous diversity of these purposes, diverse 
agreements can be encountered with or without provisions on privileges and immunities.  
In the case of the UN, the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
UN of 1946 is applicable and Article 105 of the Charter is usually invoked. 46  In the case 
                                                
41 The CGIAR, above n 36. 
42 The CGIAR Charter, above n 38, §56. 
43 Ibid, §59. 
44 Ibid, §10. 
45 Ibid, §16. 
46 Amerasinghe,  above n 11, 318. 
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of the World Bank, the Specialized Agencies Convention of 1947 is applicable, and as a 
financial institute, detailed provisions on the purposes of the privileges and immunities, 
the position of the Bank in regard to judicial processes, and all other matters are also 
dealt with extensively in the Articles of Agreement, mainly, Article VII.47 It is critical to 
mention here that the Specialized Agencies Convention contains variations from the 
general provisions for each agency and they are attached in separate annexes.48  As for 
the CGIAR, despite not having a legal personality, it was able to coordinate international 
agreements with the hosting countries mainly through the World Bank, United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).49  Some 
of the autonomous 15 international centers, which each has special agreements with their 
host country, have gained a legal personality and were able to conduct their own 
agreements to gain privileges and immunities.50 The agreements tend to be diverse and 
contain specific provisions to demark the privileges and immunities or employment 
policies between the internationally and nationally recruited staff.   Access to the 
agreements, signed by each center may be obtained from the CGIAR core documents 
collection by searching under document types “legal records”. 51  
 
According to Amerasinghe, four main privileges and immunities merit attention: 
                                                
47 World Bank the Articles of Agreements, above n 32, Article VII < 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049696~pa
gePK:43912~piPK:36602,00.html#I4> at June 13, 2008. 
48 Amerasinghe, above n 11, 319. 
49Curtis Farrar, ‘The Consultative Group For International Agricultural Research’, Case Study for 
the UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks (1999), 5.   For an example of specific 
agreement, check <http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/21/14/00040655.pdf > at June 13, 
2008. 
50 Core collection of Agreements <http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/index.cfm> at June 13, 
2008. 
51 Ibid. 
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“(i) immunity from jurisdiction; (ii) inviolability of premises and archives; (iii) privileges 
relating to currency and fiscal matters; and (iv) freedom of communications”. 52 For its 
relevance to employment relations, here, I limit the discussion to the first immunity.  
  
A. Immunity from jurisdiction 
Section 2 of the UN Convention and section 4 of the Specialized Agencies Convention 
have a similar provision wherein IOs are granted immunity from “every legal process 
except in so far as in a particular case it has expressly waived its immunity”.53  However, 
for the World Bank, as a financial organization, the general immunity is qualified in the 
Articles of Agreement.  Section 3 Article VII expressly permits actions to be brought 
against the bank in a national court: 
“only in a court of competent jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the 
Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice 
of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities. No actions shall, however, be brought 
by members or persons acting for or deriving claims from members.”54 Such a 
qualification presumes that the immunity of the World Bank is restricted to the 
circumstances described in Section 3 and the absence of general immunity is implied.55 In 
practice though, the US court, in the famous case Mendaro v World Bank 56 interpreted 
the provision to allow only suits for the external activities and contracts of the bank rather 
                                                
52 Amerasinghe, above n11, 320. 
53 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 13 February 1946 (entered into force on 
17 September 1946), §2 accessed at http://www.vilp.de/Enpdf/e017.pdf  at June 6, 2008. 
54 IBRD Articles of Agreements, above n 32, Article VII, section 3 
55 Amerasinghe, above n 11, 321.   
56 Mendaro v. The World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983) as summarized in Monroe Leigh, 
‘Mendaro v. The World Bank’ (1984) 78(1) The American Journal of International Law, 221. 
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than for the internal administration of the employees since the later is necessary to protect 
the organization from unilateral interferences by the hosting state.57  Where immunity is 
present, some courts tended though to distinguish between acts iure imperii (in sovereign 
authority) or acts iure gestionis (as a private person) to these Amerasinghe clarifies that 
the granted immunity to the IOs is distinct from that of the States and the distinction 
between acts iure imperii and acts iure gestionis will only become relevant if they are 
part of the test that determines whether the immunity from jurisdiction is necessary for 
the fulfillment of the organization’s purposes and functions.58  Amerasinghe and others 
though, acknowledge that the history of judicial precedent in many national courts around 
the world is still in favor of invoking the immunity of organizations in employment-
related matters, even where explicitly the general immunity is restricted by conventional 
law, as the case of the World Bank.59  Arguably, under international customary law, 
international civil servants or internationally recruited staff continue to lack access to 
national courts in their employment relations with IOs.  In the next section,  I show that 
the practice is not uniform and recently, more effective and adequate means for settling 
employment-disputes in IOs are being explored by courts, mainly in USA and Europe, 
signaling a greater consideration to human rights principles such as fair treatment and 
right to justice.60   
 
B. The recent development in case law of national courts 
                                                
57 Ibid.  
58 Amerasinghe, above n 11, 322. 
59 Ibid, 323.  
60 August Reinisch, ‘The immunity of International Organizations and the Jurisdiction of Their 
Administrative Tribunals’ (IILJ Working Paper 2007/11, Institute of International Law and 
Justice, New York University School of Law, 2007).   
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I discuss four important cases wherein immunity from suit in employment disputes was 
denied for IOs in national courts; the Margot Rendall Speranza Case,61 decided by a US 
court of Appeals, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany and Beer and Regan v. Germany,62 
decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Drago A. v International 
Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), Court of Cassation in Italy, and Siedler v. 
Western European Union,63decided by Brussels Labor Court of Appeal.   
 
In the first case (1995-1997), Margot Rendall-Speranza, an employee of the International 
Finance Corporation (a subsidiary of the World Bank) alleged that she was injured in her 
workplace by a fellow servant, a supervisor.  When she submitted to the corporation a 
Workers' Compensation Claim reporting the harassing acts, the response was that the 
supervisor was acting within the scope of his duties.64 In the denial of immunity from 
jurisdiction to the corporation, the court held that : “when immunity protects a defendant 
from liability for an allegedly tortious act, and that act is the only act that occurred within 
the applicable limitation period, the statute of limitations bars a claim against the 
defendant.”65 In this case, the waiving of the immunity was justified by the liability of the 
organization that is due to a lack in a clear internal policy judgement for harrassment acts 
including the infliction of emotional distress.   
                                                
61 Amerasinghe, above n 11, 327. 
62 Waite and Kennedy, Application No. 26083/94, European Court of Human Rights, 18 February 
1999, [1999] ECHR 13; as cited in Reinisch, above n 60 and Press Release accessed at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Press/1999/Feb/waite,kennedy%20epresse.html at June 13, 2008. 
63Siedler v. Western European Union, Brussels Labour Court of Appeal (4th chamber), 17 
September 2003. 
64 Margot Rendall-Speranza v. Edward A. Nassim, Appellant United States Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit. - 107 F.3d 913. Argued Nov. 12, 1996. Decided March 14, 1997 at 
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F3/107/913/ at June 6, 2008. 
65 Ibid, §30. 
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In the second case, all four applicants contended a lack in a fair hearing with the 
international employer, the European Space Agency, in their contractual relationships in 
1994/95.66 By February 1999 when the case reached the ECHR, the court considered 
whether the applicants had available to them “reasonable alternative means” to protect 
effectively their rights under Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
court held that “since the applicants had claimed the existence an employment 
relationship with ESA [European Space Agency], they could and should have had 
recourse to the ESA Appeals Board, which is "independent of the Agency", has 
jurisdiction "to hear disputes relating to any explicit or implicit decision taken by the 
Agency and arising between it and a staff member" (Regulation 33.1 of the ESA Staff 
Regulations).”67 Two major developments in case law can be highlighted from this case: 
1) access to an independent and impartial judicial process was recognized as a 
fundamental right of an international employee and 2) the lack of reasonable alternative 
employment dispute settlements in the structure of IOs may qualify for a denial of 
immunity from jurisdiction.  The immunity and privileges are granted for the “proper” 
functioning of an organization.68  Although the term “proper” was not defined, however, 
one can argue that there is an implication to establish standards for IOs’ immunity based 
on independent and impartial due processes.   
 
Similarly in the third case, Mr. Drago, a former employee of IPGRI, one of the 15 
autonomous International Agriculture Centers governed loosely by the CGIAR, launched 
an action with the Rome Tribunal invoking unfair dismissal in April 2000, the tribunal 
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upheld immunity from jurisdiction, which then lead to Mr. Drago challenging the 
judgment in the Court of Cassation in January 2004.69 The Court examined first the 
compatibility of the treaty provisions granting immunity with Art. 24 of the Italian 
Constitution which “establishes that everybody has the right to institute proceedings to 
protect his or her rights”.70  On February 2007, the court held that considering that IPGRI 
did not fulfill its obligation, contained in Art. 17 of the 1991 Agreement with the host 
country “to provide an independent and impartial judicial remedy for the resolution of 
employment-related disputes”, an infringement is noted on the fundamental principles of 
the Italian Constitution, therefore, immunity from jurisdiction is to be excluded.71 This 
case is critical in asserting the supremacy of the fundamental principles of the host 
country’s constitution law over the immunity from Jurisdiction.  Considering that many 
of the IOs are located in developing countries, however, such implication may be difficult 
to apply.  Nevertheless, the case affirms again the need for an independent and impartial 
judicial system for international staff members.  Despite that IPGRI subscribed later to 
the International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT) to resolve 
employment disputes (in 2001), the independence and impartiality of these tribunals have 
been questioned. 72   
 
The last case is very important, in my opinion, and as discussed by Reinisch, the Brussels 
labour court went a step further and investigated whether the internal appeals procedure 
for employment disputes within the Union “offered all of the guarantees inherent in the 
                                                
69 Drago A. v International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), Court of Cassation, all 
civil sections, 19 February 2007, no 3718 (unpublished), ILDC 827 (IT 2007). 
70 Ibid, §H4. 
71 Ibid, §H1. 
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notion of a fair trial”. 73 The court’s findings pointed to the following shortcomings: 
“there were no provisions for the execution of the judgments of the WEU [Western 
European Union] appeals commission; there was no public hearing and the publication of 
decisions was not guaranteed; the members of the commission were appointed by the 
intergovernmental Council of the WEU for a short time period (two years) which created 
an excessively close link with the organization itself [ lack of independency]; and it was 
not possible to challenge a particular member of the commission [lack of impartiality].” 74  
Considering these facts, the court held that the personnel statute lacks all the guarantees 
needed to secure a fair trial and the immunity from jurisdiction imposes a limitation on 
the access to the normal courts and therefore, such limitation is incompatible with Article 
6(1) of ECHR.75 
 
III. The internal laws and structure of international organizations 
 
Despite that there is still a debate on whether the internal rules of IOs form a law 
(with legal effects), the predominant view is that the internal law is part of international 
law.76 The body of internal law includes taking decisions, making rules, establishing 
regulations and staff procedures and implementing the provisions of the constitutive 
instruments that have supremacy in law and are binding on all members of the 
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organizations including the staff.77 For IOs, there is no single body of employment law. 
Each organization develops its own internal employment law that contains both written 
and unwritten sources of law and the internal organization structure is immune from suit 
in national court.  IOs employing widely varying nationalities and working at 
geographically dispersed locations around the world are entitled to independent 
governance for their employees.78 In other words, these organizations have no duty under 
any national law to “refrain from gender discrimination and harassment of its staff 
members - or racial, religious, ethnic, age, or disability discrimination, for that matter.”79 
In this section, I cross-examine the complex relationship between the organization and 
staff members in three different organizational contexts, elaborate on their perceived 
“terms of employment” or “conditions of employment” and the complex “discretion of 
power” entitlement as reflected in the practice of the organization. 
 
A. The contract between the organization and staff 
Whereas the relationship with private parties (other than employees) is based on a broad 
choice of potential applicable law, as recognized by the 1977 Oslo Resolution on 
“Contracts Concluded by International Organizations with Private Persons” by the 
Institut de Droit International80, the relationship with the international staff is limited to 
the internal employment law or internal administrative law of the organization and 
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regularly exempted from the national law.81 The employment relationship with the 
nationally recruited staff, as the case in the international agriculture organizations of the 
CGIAR for example, the applicable law is national law as per agreements drawn with the 
host country.82 The employment relationship oscillates between being contractual or 
statutory, and with the exception of the EU and OECD, almost all other organizations 
claim a contractual relationship with their staff.83 In the case of UN, a provision is made 
in the Staff Regulations and Staff rules for a letter of appointment that is based on an 
offer and an acceptance without a clear mentioning of a contract of employment, but, in 
several cases, The United Nations Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) has assumed that 
employment is based on a contract.84   
 
The nature of the relationship in practice may not though be limited to the contract 
withdrawn between the staff and the organization.   Once appointment is made, an 
employee receives an offer or a letter and by signing that letter, the employee accepts not 
only the terms of the contract but also all the other bits (explicit and implicit) of what 
makes the internal law of the institute.  In de Merode, The World Bank Administrative 
Tribunal (WBAT) stated: “the fact that the Bank’s employees enter its service on the 
basis of an exchange of letters does not mean that these contractual instruments contain 
an exhaustive statement of all relevant rights and duties. The two sides are agreed on this 
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point. The contract may be the sine qua non of the relationships, but it remains no more 
than one of a number of elements which collectively establish the ensemble of conditions 
of employment operative between the Bank and its staff members.”85 In Kaplan, in 
establishing the legal position of staff members, WBAT distinguished between 
contractual elements and statutory elements; the personal status of each staff being 
contractual (nature of contract, salary, and position within the institute) and all other 
matters that affect in general the organization and its proper functioning being statutory.  
The Tribunal went on to add that while the contractual elements cannot be changed 
without the agreement of the two parties [private contract law], the statutory elements 
may change without further notice and the changes are binding on staff members.86  
 
From a legal perspective, Amerasinghe clarifies that although statutory elements are not 
part of the contract of employment, they may govern the employment relationship, and 
therefore, “the power to alter the terms of conditions of employment” may be different in 
the two cases.87 Based on the view that the legal position is generally recognized by most 
IOs,88 one can argue here that the position [the right to use various statutory elements in 
the conditions of employment] may extract any equality base between the employer and 
the employee and diminishes her/his bargaining ability and instead strengthen the 
discretionary power of the management in altering the terms of employment.   Therefore, 
it is critical to understand what internal justice system was introduced to counter balance 
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the discretionary power of the internal management, but we will get to that later.  Now, 
let us look at what the ensemble of the conditions of employment looks like. 
 
 
B. The ensemble  
In de Merode, the WBAT stated that statutory elements can be found in the constituent 
instrument of the organization, Staff Rules and Regulations, and depending on their 
content, certain manuals, circulars, notes and statements issued by the various 
hierarchical management teams.89  
i. Constituent instruments 
The constituent instrument is regarded as the basic statute or constitution of the 
organization and it prevails on the hierarchical priority of the tribunal as was addressed 
and confirmed in Howrani judgment No. 4 by UNAT and in de Merode, by WBAT.90 So, 
for example, the UN Charter or the Articles of Agreement of the Bank are the constituent 
instrument for these organizations.  Article 1 of the Charter provides broad equal rights 
"promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" whereas Article 8 
acknowledges the principle of equality and particular antidiscrimination norms and rules 
out sex discrimination in employment at the UN.91 IOs that lack such treaty-based norms 
adopted equivalent broad prohibitions against employment discrimination in their Staff 
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Rules and Regulations. These pronouncements though leave many procedural and 
substantive aspects of discrimination law unaddressed, and in the lack of comprehensive 
legislation governing claims for employment discrimination such as Title VII of the U.S. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the UK Race Relations Acts of 1968, or the Canadian Human 
Rights Act of 1976, broad constitutional provisions and general principles remain the 
primary protections against employment discrimination.92  Apart from referring to “the 
general principle”, the tribunals have not considered claims that rely on international 
human rights conventions or other conventions.93 Some contend that they are persuasive 
law but non-binding94 including Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966),95 Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,96 and 
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.97 
ii. Organization rules and policies 
The rules and policies are decisions taken in an exercise of power accorded to the 
executive branch to conduct the functions and purposes of the organization. 98 Formally, 
they are the by-laws that the staff member needs to refer to. In addition, the 
administration of the organization, in the exercise of powers derived from the constitution 
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or delegated by the executive organ, establish staff rules and even some manuals, 
circulars, notes, public statements of the organization are also considered sources of 
law.99  Some tribunals have held that the rules need to conform not contradict with staff 
policies.100 As for public statements, there is no clear rule to confirm them as opinio juris, 
or even more critical, a “codicil” to the contract, in de Merode, the tribunal stated that it 
would determine on case-by-case basis whether these statements are binding on the staff 
based mainly on their consistent practice within the organization. 101  While this may 
seem facially reasonable and potentially expand the power of the tribunal to interpret the 
Bank’s rules, the implication that the rules can change unilaterally in the organization and 
are binding without discussion with the staff can be confusing and misleading to the staff 
themselves.  
iii. General principles of law 
All administrative tribunals held that general principles including the principle of 
equality in employment relations, are applicable and they were consistently invoked to 
control the exercise of administrative powers and discretions.102 Through specific 
judgments of the international administrative tribunals, the principle of equality and the 
right to equal treatment became part of the internal employment law of international 
organizations.103  Whether they are derived from national law, international law or other 
administrative tribunal judgments, the tribunals have been averse to find support for their 
sources.  They may include “contract or conflict of laws”, the contractual “force 
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majeure”, the principle of “good faith”, the principle of “unjust enrichment”, and the 
principle of estoppel.104 The application of various principles led to a lack in the 
consistency and uniformity of tribunal decisions on discrimination issues and therefore, 
the cases for employment discrimination are unpredictable in tribunals. 
iv. Practice of the organization 
The organization own administrative practice is considered an unwritten source of law 
and may give rise to legal rights and the “general principles” of international 
administrative law.105 There is a strict requirement by the tribunals that the practice of the 
institute is consistent and not arbitrary because of the conviction that it represents a legal 
obligation on the part of organization towards its employee.106 In the practice of the 
organization, the constant and uniform usage element is critical for rules to be accepted 
as law.107  In de Merode, the WBAT stated: 
 
“The practice of the organization may also, in certain circumstances, become part of the 
conditions of employment. Obviously, the organization would be discouraged from 
taking measures favorable to its employees on an ad hoc basis if each time it did so it had 
to take the risk of initiating a practice which might become legally binding upon it.  The 
integration of practice into the conditions of employment must therefore be limited to that 
of which there is evidence that it is followed by the organization in the conviction that it 
reflects a legal obligation, as was recognized by the International Court of Justice in its 
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Advisory Opinion on Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO (ICJ Reports 
1956, p. 91).”108 
 
IV. Modes of employment dispute settlements 
 
Article VIII section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN 
provides: 
 
“The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of: 
a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law character to which 
the United Nations is a party; 
b) disputes involving any official of the United Nations who by reason of his official 
position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the Secretary-General”109 
For the first three years in the UN’s life, a joint administrative team was settling disputes 
leading to a final and ultimate decision by the Secretary-General and clearly, the staff 
were not satisfied with this process.110 The internal remedies, such as the Job Appeals 
Board, do not rely on judicial processes and their decisions are not based on legal rules of 
principles.  When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in December 
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1948, the scope of section 29 came under questioning because Article 8 of the 
Declaration states: 
“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by the law.”111 
In 1949, The UN General Assembly responded to such inadequacy by establishing an 
administrative tribunal, UNAT, as an independent court with binding power within the 
organization.112 The decision was recognized and approved by ICJ in Effect of Awards of 
Compensation case.113 The Statute of UNAT was not part of the Staff Regulations and 
was not meant to be as an advisory organ or a subordinate branch of the Assembly, 
instead it was enacted as a distinct instrument by the General Assembly to be an 
independent and truly judicial body capable of making final judgments without appeal 
and based on a well-established and recognized principle of law in the field of 
employment relations. 114  The Tribunal is qualified to deal with any matter related to 
employment relations with present and past UN employees.115Amerasinghe confirmed 
that the judgment is res judicata and binding on both the individual complainant and the 
UN and must be carried out by it.116 However, Article 10.1 of UNAT Statute implies that 
the final decision seems to rest not with the tribunal but with the Secretary General who 
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“in the interests of the UN” will approve the final decision.117  In recent years, the ICJ 
confirmed that there is no procedure for the enforcement of judgments of UNAT within 
the organization, to this Judge Amerasinghe replied that if organizations do not honor the 
tribunal judgments, a culture of mistrust instead of a full and undivided loyalty will be 
exercised by the staff, a situation the UN can not afford to have.”118 Because UNAT as 
with the other administrative tribunals such as WBAT, are perceived as international 
tribunals entrusted to administer justice in employment relations, members of the tribunal 
need to be real judges not “judges in practice”. 119 The law applied is the internal law of 
the organization and the general principles of law that are derived from various sources 
mainly international law and the French administrative law system of the Civil law which 
also provides for equality before the law, essential individual liberties, and the judicial 
review principles.120 Since its inception, the Statute has been amended several times, 
however, Article 10.1 still stands. 121 It is important to note here that the jurisprudence 
developed by UNAT or any other Tribunal is a prime source for the general principles of 
international administrative law. This means that one administrative tribunal is not bound 
to follow the same approach as taken by another tribunal let alone the final decision of 
another tribunal.122 
 
 “Susana Mendaro, a citizen of Argentina, was hired by the World Bank in 1977, and 
took up work as a researcher in Washington, D.C. She became part of a workforce of 
                                                
117 UNAT Statute, above n 115, art 10.1. 
118 Amerasinghe,  above n 110, 3. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid, 3; and check Patterson, above n 92, 5. 
121 UNAT Statute, above n 115 
122 Patterson, above n 92, 6. 
 31 
some 6,000, overwhelmingly based in Washington but recruited internationally so as to 
reflect the wide range of member nations, then 140 in number. Soon after her 
appointment, Ms. Mendaro fell victim - so she believed - to a pattern of gender 
discrimination and harassment by her supervisors and fellow workers: fewer assignments 
than her male counterparts, obstruction in her work, unwanted verbal and physical 
advances, denial of a promotion, disinclination to investigate her grievances when she 
raised them, and ultimately unwarranted termination of employment in 1979. She 
commenced a lawsuit in federal court against the World Bank for violation of the U.S. 
statute that forbids workplace discrimination and harassment based on gender - known as 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act - but her case was summarily dismissed, without 
her being given an opportunity to present any proof of the Bank's wrongdoing.” 123 
Based on this case, Mendaro v World Bank, Robert Gorman, Judge and former President 
of WBAT, described the potential internal environment of the World Bank as “ literally a 
lawless environment, in which it [the World Bank] is free to treat its employees without 
fear of statutory or contractual liability, or even of liability in tort.”124  Gorman went on 
to add that the recognition of such a legal vacuum in the internal organization structure 
lead to the establishment in 1980 of an international employment arbitration court to 
which employees of an international organization may take their grievances that arise 
within the workplace, for a final determination that is binding on the organization.  The 
World Bank President Robert McNamara wanting “to bring the rule of law to the Bank's 
internal operations, to regulate the behavior of management so as to assure fair treatment 
of staff members, and as a result to enhance the morale of the staff and to make the Bank 
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a desirable and efficient place to work” established voluntarily the WBAT.125 Other 
underlying reasons for the establishment of WBAT was the different nature and object of 
the World Bank as a financial institution carrying out its purposes through financial 
activities rather than through consultation or policy recommendation and wanting to be 
independent from political organizations such as the UN.126  Similar to the Statute of 
UNAT, WBAT empowers the tribunal to “hear and pass judgment upon any application 
by which an individual member of the staff alleges non-ob non-observance of the 
contract of employment or terms of appointment of such staff member."127 The "contract 
of employment" and "terms of appointment" are though defined under Article II (1) of the 
Statute to "include all pertinent regulations and rules in force at the time of alleged non- 
observance."128 Under Article II (2), The Statute imposed two jurisdictional prerequisites; 
the exhaustion of internal remedies that allow the aggrieved staff member or her 
representative to present their case first to the Appeals Committee and if the staff member 
remains unsatisfied, she has 120 days post the final management decision to submit the 
application before the tribunal.129 Under Article II (3), the Statute calls for an 
enforcement of an individual contract between the Bank and its individual employee, 
implying no allowance for a collective bargaining representation by a union or 
association on behalf of the employee and the governing staff rules are usually solely of 
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the unilateral making of the Bank i.e. not formulated in consultation with the staff 
representative.130  
As for the CGIAR and its 15 international organizations, under paragraph 103, the 
Charter recognizes the independence of each organization in the matters of staff 
management.  The Staff Rules and Regulations of each organization has its own internal 
Grievance or Appeal Committee to settle employment disputes and details of the 
procedure remains within the Human resource office of the organization.131  Dispute 
resolution proceeds hierarchically by meetings with the supervisor first then with the 
other branches of the executive management team with no reference to a right of access 
to court or independent evaluation by external reviewers.132 None of the15 international 
organizations of the CGIAR has its own separate administrative tribunal but as we have 
seen in the previous section, individual organizations may subscribe to the ILO 
administrative tribunal.133 
 
V. Discretion of power and the permissive rise of alternative forms of 
discrimination  
 
Over the years, the three organizations have indeed grown in many ways.  From a few 
hundred employees, the UN has 14,000 this year,134 the World Bank also started with a 
                                                
130 Gorman, above n 79, 3. 
131 Staff Rules and Regulations (IITA, November 2004) 23 
http://intranet.iita.org/resources/IRS%20policy%20manual.pdf  at June 6, 2008. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Drago, above n 69. 
134 United Nations, https://jobs.un.org/elearn/production/home.html at June 13, 2008. 
 34 
few hundred in 1940 and now there are 10,000 employees135, and in the CGIAR, there are 
almost 8000 scientists and staff136 after a modest start of also a few hundred. The 
hierarchical bureaucracy persisted or even initiated if it was lacking, the workplace 
expanded with potential news comers, implicit contracts for long term job security 
flagged, modified, or terminated and most importantly, a legitimacy of freedom from 
national court was maintained to senior executives at the organizations due to the granted 
privileges. 
 
Amerasinghe argues “the immunity from jurisdiction relates only to the absence of a 
judicial system for deciding disputes arising from such relationship and does not 
necessarily mean that the relationships are outside the pale of law”.137 In his opinion it is, 
“the special position of the international civil servant within international society that 
makes it important that he have some independent system of law to protect him”.  In this 
section, I seek to show that it is the special position of the centered discretionary power 
of executives (mainly men) that limits opportunities in the workplace and enable subtle 
and new forms of discrimination.     
 
A. The UN experience: inequalities “in action” 
In 2004, a series of events shook the UN.  In the words of the retired head of legal 
services in the UN, François Loriot, “never in its history has the credibility and relevance 
of the UN been so heavily damaged by a series of corruption, mismanagement and sexual 
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harassment scandals, reaching the highest levels of authority”.138  An independent survey 
carried out throughout the UN system revealed that the staff had no trust in the senior UN 
officials, the UN staff unions protested the lack of compliance by the senior management 
with its own Nine Global Compact Principles, and in 2005, an independent investigation 
the oil-for Food-Programme uncovered “major procurement irregularities, gross 
negligence in contract administration and misconduct by top UN officials.139 
 
Loriot’s report reveals an important organization practice in the UN; “law and 
accountability of enforcement at the UN is almost nil, being applied mostly at the lower 
levels, and rarely at higher levels”.140  Such an acknowledgment indicates that not only a 
discriminatory bias exists between the staff members in the UN, but also by adopting 
impunity as a policy tool, the bias is perceived and/or accepted as a legitimate practice of 
the organization.   Loriot offers a pyramid structure to the class-based inequality present 
in the organization; the higher you are in the rank, the more discretion you possess, and if 
or when there is a threat, an action can be ordered internally on the subordinates, which 
may take 4-5 years in the UN, enough time “to turn around the situation, manipulate the 
evidence and get off the hook”.141  
 
The report also provides evidence on the many ways class inequality can enable the 
perpetuity of discriminatory biases and even control compliance by lower rank staff 
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members in the organization.  In Levy, UNAT found Mr. levy guilty for falsifying 
documents and he was dismissed by UNDP although none of his supervisors were 
approached then or now.142 During the proceedings, Mr. Levy raised an interesting 
argument about 1) the presumed legality of the instructions received from supervisors and 
the “scapegoats” concept and 2) the hostile workplace environment that prevents people 
from expressing reservations or from reporting supervisors’ improper acts so that control 
and compliance are ensured by the organization.143  
 
The substantive harm to the individual, financial and emotional, caused by “discretionary 
power” of the senior management was even documented in Mr. Bangoura’s case.  In 
January 1997, a Washington Post’s article reported that Mr. Bangoura, a staff member 
fighting drug traffic operations in Africa, embezzled UN funds and committed sexual 
harassment towards a female colleague in Africa.144  Within 4 days, the secretary General 
issued a statement to the Press indicating that such a misconduct will not be tolerated and 
the employee will be severed from service and so in April 1997, Mr. Bangoura filed an 
appeal before the Joint Appeals Board claiming his innocence. 145 In July 1998, the Board 
recognized the improper use of discretion, the arbitrary decisions, and the denial of due 
process for the Appellant by the office of the Secretary General and submitted its 
recommendations stating so to the Secretary General Office, however, it took another 7 
months (February 1999) for the Secretary General decided on the Board’s report by 
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rejecting a public apology to Mr. Bangoura and compensating him only for $20,000.146  
By that time, Mr. Bangoura was not only without a job for almost two years, he was a 
refugee, and with a ruined reputation.  By late February 1999, he filed an appeal before 
UNAT and eventually after almost 5 years from 1997 event, he was granted judgment; 
the Tribunal endorsed the Appeal Board findings of a major breach of due process by the 
administration and a violation of the rule of presumption of innocence.147  Although the 
Tribunal awarded him 2-year-base salary (the maximum under tribunal Statute), Mr. 
Bangoura has incurred a loss of employment for 5 years and a psychic burden for the rest 
of his life.  
 
B. The World Bank experience 
The original design of the World Bank is fascinating and revealing. Not only that all 
Bank Presidents to date have been white male and US citizens, they also have held the 
ultimate power in employment relations.148 Internally, the Bank runs as a cooperative 
owned by 185 countries with each represented at the Board of Governors that meets 
annually to oversee the operations of the Bank.149 However, for the day-to-day 
operations, the Board delegates its function to the 24 Executive Directors who sit on the 
Executive Board, meet twice a week to run the affairs of the Bank.150 Each Executive 
Director represents either a single country, as discussed earlier, such as the case for 
France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, or a group of 
countries, such as the case for the rest of the countries (for example, the Ethiopian 
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Executive Director represents 21 countries).151 Such a disparate treatment on country 
representation impacts every aspect of the internal affairs of the Bank which includes 
making decisions regarding lending, approving loans and guarantees, setting new policies 
and developing administrative budget, and most importantly, selecting and potentially 
dismissing the World Bank President. 152 Besides this class-based bias, the voting power 
in the Bank is weighted and based on a country’s quota.153 Under the current quota 
formula, each member has a base of 250 votes, to which depending on the size of their 
economies, additional votes can be received. 154  For example, as of December 2007, The 
USA has 16.38% of the votes while Ethiopia has 0.08%.155 The visibility of the 
inequality in the foundation structure is striking and applied even at the level of amending 
the Articles of Agreements.  For any amendment to take place, 85% majority to the total 
voting power is required. 156    With the USA holding the highest voting power, the 
answer becomes clear who is indeed holding the business helm of the organization and 
how disparate treatment is legitimized within the Bank internal affairs.  
 
As for the selection of the president, who is in charge of the management and the staff, 
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there is no formal selection procedure.  Based on Section 5 (a) of the Bank’s Articles of 
Agreement, the Executive Directors have the authority to select the president and by 
tradition, all the World Bank Presidents have been United States nationals, I guess as the 
largest shareholder, the United States, nominates the President who is then elected for a 5 
year renewable term by The Board of Governors.157 In a recent report by the Government 
Accountability Project (GAP), the office of the president and its established Department 
of Institutional Integrity (INT) were implied and evidence presented for breaching 
established due process procedures and confidentiality, conflicting imperatives, and 
biases towards US nationals for higher ranking positions and remuneration of the INT 
staff.158 Similar to what we have seen in the UN, the misconduct is associated with the 
top level of the executive branch.  While Robert Gorman and other colleagues at WBAT 
were developing the principles of “détournement de pouvoir” and “due process” in the 
organization administrative law159, the senior officials were exploring the limits of their 
discretionary power privileges.   
 
C. The CGIAR: Old traditional hierarchy 
The class power of the CGIAR is mainly derived from the fact that it is a US-based 
enterprise and although, it does not have a legal personality, the World Bank’s 
sponsorship and provision of the chairmanship give the Group an international 
legitimacy.160 Until recently, CGIAR had no Charter or constitution, by-laws, or written 
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rules of procedures and relied on informal procedural guidelines,161 and as they say, the 
old boys’ network to achieve its mission.  The Bank has been the largest donor in the 
system and it contributes to its management and research programs of its individual 
centers.162 The internal structure of the system remains fragile due to 1) a funding 
situation that is ad hoc (voluntary donations not entitlements)163 and restrictive (donors 
tie their funding to their own research, personnel, or institution), 2) a consensus decision-
making (or no decision-making because of the wide constituency of member States, 
private sectors, and NGOs) that leaves the Chairman, or this year, the Chairwoman, the 
World Bank vice-president, with the ultimate responsibility to “declare and articulate” 
that consensus position, 3) the fragmentation of and competition among the 15 centers for 
resources, and 4) its perceived political bias.164 The fragility of the system structure 
impacts employment relations in individual centers at various levels.  Due to the 
restricted and project-based funding, individual centers undergo various hiring and 
retrenchment cycles at all levels but substantively at the base level employees, short-term 
instead of long-term contracts are the norm, and to ensure continuity and flexibility of 
research programs, substantive resources remain consolidated under the discretion of the 
senior managers of individual centers.  
 
As noted above, individual centers are autonomous, possess a legal personality based on 
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their functions and purposes, and are self-governed by a board of trustees.165 Out of the 
15 centers, 11 are located in developing countries wherein strong class, gender, and race 
powers intersect due to structural differences in employment relationships between 
internationally and nationally recruited staff.  Whereas rules and policies for nationally 
and internationally recruited staff may vary between individual centers, employment 
relations with nationally recruited staff are generally covered by national employment 
laws or as agreed upon in individual treaties signed between the center and the hosting 
state.166  The rights and obligations of the staff are subject to the specific terms of the 
treaties.  Such agreements may also guarantee that the governance of the employment 
relations with internationally recruited staff is solely the responsibility of the organization 
and its internal laws due to the accorded immunities and privileges of international 
organizations.167 None of the individual centers has its own administrative tribunal to 
settle employment disputes with their staff.  In the lack of any subscription to other 
administrative tribunals, rights to fair treatment and due process through an independent 
and impartial judicial review are not guaranteed.  Considering the stressful dynamics of 
such a workplace, the constant movement of senior executives between states, the 
pressure to deliver, the ambition and prejudices of senior managers, and their privileges 
with the “discretionary power”, arbitrary procedures and hasty decisions are not 
uncommon and discriminatory biases, intentional or unintentional, are more often 
encountered among internal groups and between groups.168  Under the current system, the 
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only available remedy for employment disputes for internationally recruited staff at the 
centers is through an internal Appeals Committee.169 Staff rules and regulations guarantee 
the right of the staff to bring their grievances to the committee but the rules are silent on 
the procedural guarantees for fair treatment.  As Amerasinghe pointed out earlier, the 
Appeals Committee does not rely on judicial processes and the decisions taken are not 
based on legal rules of principles.170 The international staff is at the mercy of the leader 
of the day! 
 
National recruited staff account for 85% of the workforce (6,800) with a wide range of 
employment categories, covering mainly the basic managerial and technical services 
needed for the day-to-day operation of the organization.171 Until recently, almost all 
internationally recruited staff hold higher positions than nationally recruited staff and are 
better paid due to their international status and granted privileges and immunity.  Beside 
the highly visible and strained class bias between the two categories of staff members, 
gender, as a social construction,172 is very salient in these organizations.   Because of the 
gender performative character and its parallelism to the performative and discursive 
nature of race as well, individuals act according to certain prescribed notions of what it 
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means to be a “man” or a “woman” reflecting norms of behavior of the outside society.173 
Similar to the stereotypes and inflexible racial labeling with a maintained white 
supremacy, rules of conduct, implicit and explicit, and other enforcement organizational 
mechanisms regulate gender performance and ensure conformity with mainstream 
norms.174  Indeed, 73% of the staff members in the CGIAR are male and all key senior 
positions are still male-dominated whereas women’s positions dominate the secretarial, 
the administrative, and scientific support services.175  Half of the internationally recruited 
women in senior positions leave the institute within 3-5 years of their employment176 and 
the latest figure on women’s participation in the Center management is only 9% despite 
an almost 18 years of coaching efforts by the CGIAR Gender and Diversity program to 
bring about some gender diversity into the system177and even with a closer look on the 
9% figure, Women’s role is more of support rather real decision making. 178 Taken 
together, the class relations along with gendered and sexualized assumptions not only 
shape the selection of executives in the individual centers but also supervisory practices, 
wage-setting processes in the workplace, and its routine day-to-day operations.179 
Discriminatory biases are legitimate for the purposes and functions of these 
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organizations.   
 
VI. A way forward 
 
In this contribution, I examined three variants of an international workplace and their 
complex dynamics of employment relations with their own staff.  In all three 
organizations, the relationship between an individual and the organization extends 
beyond just a contractual agreement between two equal parties (private contract law) to a 
relationship that is dependent on written and unwritten sources of law within the specific 
boundaries of the internal structure of the one of the parties, the employer. This de facto 
inequality of bargaining power for the employee with the employer is compounded by a 
granted immunity from jurisdiction of national courts to these organizations.  In other 
words, legally, some of the most important employment rights, the right for a fair 
hearing, independent and impartial judicial review, and “due process” are denied and 
until recently, most world’s national courts regularly invoked immunity in employment 
disputes.  However, as discussed above, some of European courts have begun to limit 
such immunities under national laws.  The Siedler v Western European Union Case180 is 
worth revisiting since the Court not only waived the immunity for the international 
organization, but established a precedent for the need of international organizations to 
have alternative dispute settlement mechanisms that guarantee the real and effective not 
theoretical and illusive rights of employees, as articulated under Article 6 of the European 
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Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.181 The Court stated “Those 
guarantees relate to the right of access to an independent and impartial tribunal, 
established by law, the right for the case to be heard fairly (which implies, inter alia, the 
equality of arms, an adversarial system, a statement of reasons on which decisions are 
based, and the right to appear in person), the public nature of the proceedings and of the 
decisions, and a reasonable period of time for the rendering of decisions.”182 Legal 
scholars such as August Reinisch and others are optimistic that more national courts will 
be investigating the availability and adequacy of alternative dispute settlement 
mechanisms.   Reinisch reported that some courts are even denying immunity if 
international organizations do not have an administrative tribunal or the level of 
protection provided by the organization is inadequate.183 I guess, cautious is due here 
because of the more challenging situations with organizations, such as the international 
centers of the CGIAR that do not have their own administrative tribunals and wherein the 
majority of the centers are located in developing countries where the courts are just 
developing.  Staff rules and regulations, which are accessible from some of these centers, 
are silent on the procedural guarantees for the right of a fair hearing or “due process”, the 
scope and nature of the Appeals committee, the public transparency in committee 
decisions, and on whether the employee has a right even to an administrative tribunal.184   
 
On the other hand, with the UN and the World Bank, having their own judicial courts or 
administrative tribunals to provide remedies for employment disputes in their perspective 
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organizations, only a contract of employment is enforced between an individual and the 
organization thus, the right of employee to collective bargaining is not applicable before 
the tribunals in these two organizations.  It is important to remember that there is not a 
single employment law for international organizations.  In de Merode, the tribunal 
discussed whether the Bank’s “conditions of employment” incorporate those conditions 
defined by other tribunals to be “common to all international organizations” and which 
can then become a “common corpus juris shared by all international officials”, however 
it refrained from adopting such a corpus of international administrative law, and 
concluded that the tribunal is restricted to decide its cases within the organized internal 
legal system of the World Bank.185 Through specific judgments by the administrative 
tribunals, nevertheless, general principles such as the principle of equality and the right to 
equal treatment became incorporated across the various tribunals.186 Considering the fact 
that the tribunals are not bound by each other’s precedents, the judgments in sensitive 
employment issues such as discrimination, differ and the claims remain lacking 
consistency and uniformity in usage, two important elements to be accepted as law. 187  
 
The current practices in the UN and World Bank, as documented by François Loriot and 
the GAP project, indicate a major deficit in compliance with principles of “due process” 
and fair treatment by the senior executive branch of the organization, a lack in 
accountability or transparency before even the administrative tribunals, and a disparate 
impact liability on the staff members.  While the intent of the founders of administrative 
tribunals may not have been to create a skewed judicial court, I argue that the current 
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structure of the tribunals or as a matter of fact, the structure of the organization is 
permissive to or does not account for the new forms of abuses for the discretion power by 
senior managers.  Indeed, there are heated debates on whether these tribunals actually 
meet the standards of an independent and impartial judicial review due to the lack of total 
independence from the executive branch of the organization, their restrictive jurisdiction 
to the internal laws of the organization, the nature, qualifications, and duration of judges 
tenure, as well as in some tribunals, the lack of enforcement procedures on the 
organization part (UNAT).188 Such debates enforce the sayings of Carothers that affecting 
the rule of law in a place is a complex task, mainly because of the uncertainty of whether 
rule-of-law providers should focus on organization building or instead attempt 
intervening in ways that would affect how individuals understand, use, and value law.  In 
employment law context in the IOs, Amerasinghe insisted that focusing on the judicial 
gap in IOs can be misleading, the main issue, in his opinion, is whether the specific 
position of the international employee can be guaranteed rights by an independent and 
impartial law to achieve workplace equality and he proposed the development of new 
independent law.189  Considering the reality and extent of the perpetuated inequality 
regimes and their established legitimacy in the various international contexts, I hold a 
pessimistic view.  
 
Joan Acker, a sociologist with an expansive experience in organization workplace 
dynamics, confirms that all organizations embed, at varying levels, inequality regimes, 
defined as “loosely interrelated practices, processes, actions, and meanings that result in 
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and maintain class, gender, and racial inequalities within particular organizations.”190 
However, by examining the practical day-to-day work of the organization and the 
interplays in decision-making processes, realistic and complex inequality regimes, which 
enable the perpetuity of discriminatory biases in an organization, become identifiable and 
a potential target for change.  In addition, looking at the pattern of changes within the 
organization and the oppositions it encountered can be as powerful for our understanding 
to affect change.191 In this contribution, all three organizations embedded a strong class 
inequality with a male supremacy and complex race-based inequality regimes, especially 
in the international centers of the CGIAR.  The salient class inequality was visible at 
various levels of the hierarchy,  intersectioned with strong gendered and racial 
assumptions, and was modulated by a centered tightly knit decision-making power.  In 
the international CGIAR centers, the disproportionate impact of such inequality regimes 
on women’s employment is more alarming and can be deduced from 1) the low 
participation number of women in senior positions (9%), 2) the high percentage of 
women’s departures (>25%) within a few years of employment, 3) the consolidated 
decision-making power by the top few male managers, 4) the self-governed structure that 
lacks public transparency and accountability and 5) the lack of any judicial review for 
employment cases or procedural guarantees to internal hearings, the right to fair 
treatment remains contingent on the leader of the day. When women venture into such a 
traditional male-dominated positions, within a few years, a large majority seem to leave 
voluntary and the few stubborn ones who try to resist, are eased out by careful planning, 
established paper trail for their incompetence, and ‘fair’ treatment dismissal 
                                                
190 Acker, above n172, 443. 
191 Ibid.  
 49 
procedures.192 The male domination of that workplace can then be reinforced and the 
traditional gender segregation is reassured for more years to come.    
 
Based on several years of staff surveys in these organizations and the consistent low 
participation of women in senior positions, questions were raised regarding the reasons 
for such a failure by the CGIAR centers and their policies to attract the best of women.193 
I can only echo what Margaret Thornton said about the Australian legislation on sex 
discrimination:  “the commitment to equality is lukewarm, the ambit of operation is 
narrow, its procedures tortuous, and its exceptions legion”194 as well as many of the 
justified reluctance of women to come forward and describe their discriminatory 
experiences or disparate treatments.  However, due to the substantial psychic and 
practical barriers in such rigid workplaces, such reluctance is justifiable.  To complain 
formally means being exposed as "the victim," a humiliating and disempowering position 
as that enduring the harassment itself, sometimes more so, particularly for senior 
women.195 Discriminatory harassment such as sexual harassment and other forms of 
discrimination in the international workplace is still perceived as individual pathological 
behavior based on a sexual content in the workplace, rather than about sexism.  The 
double de facto inequality position of women allow for many forms of sex-based 
discrimination in these organizations. Women can face harassment from supervisors 
because they are not sufficiently docile and compliant or bullied because they are too 
vulnerable.  The harassment could be a simple interpersonal hostility, a"ganging up" on a 
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co-worker, or an emotional abuse.  The subtlety of these actions is part of the normal day-
to day operations of the workplace and it is very difficult to challenge them legally.196  
 
 Tristin Green offers a hope, a way forward, and a legal framework, based on a structural 
approach, to address discrimination.  Using a structural approach, which identifies the 
moderation of discriminatory bias in workplace decision-making, as a form of 
discrimination, would establish a norm or a legal obligation on the employer not to 
facilitate discriminatory decision-making in the workplace.197 She builds on the 
established civil right laws and argues that “employer facilitation of discriminatory bias 
in workplace decision-making violates the longstanding norm against different treatment 
in employment on the basis of protected characteristics, and thus inflicts a moral wrong 
on individuals in the employment relationship, regardless of whether the employer or the 
decision maker acts with animus or intent to harm.”198 Using a structural approach 
eliminates the labeling and branding of the discrimination actors and focuses more on the 
acts of discrimination in a contextual structure based on the differential impact liability.    
 
Employers, simply engage in wrongful discrimination through organizational decisions 
that concern “workplace policies, operations, culture, decision-making systems”, all the 
bits of a structure that shape our perceptions and prejudices.199  With this approach, one 
hopes that even the most traditional organizations would be comfortable enacting policies 
                                                
196 Debra Parkes, ‘Introduction To The Symposium On Workplace Bullying: Targeting 
Workplace Harassment In Quebec: On Exporting A New Legislative Agenda’ (2004) 8 Employee 
Rights and Employment Policy Journal 423. 
197 Green, above n 2, 852. 
198 Green, above n 2, 883. 
199 Green, above n 2, 854. 
 51 
to hold employers wrong acts for structural discrimination and the activists may cherish a 
small step forward on social equality. 
 
 
 
